Further rebuttal to Reviewer Ssa1
We thank the reviewer for the follow-up. We are glad to hear that you find our clarifications on the interplay between heavy-tailed rewards and privacy very informative.
We would like to provide further clarifications on the setting by answering your specific questions.
**Privacy notion in the paper** We adopt the central DP for MABs as our privacy notion, which has been widely used in previous works on private MABs [19,20,24]. We would like to give more details about this notion in the following two steps.
1. We first give the standard interpretation of this privacy notion. In particular, the adversary is an external party that has the information on all the $T$ actions during the MAB learning process. The information we aim to protect is the reward generated by each of the $T$ users. Central DP (cf. Def. 3.4) protects user's reward in the following sense: The external third-party (adversary) cannot determine the reward of any user $t \in [T]$ with high confidence by observing all $T$ generated actions. This is because, by defintion, while changing the reward of any user $t$, the output action sequences are indistinguishable in probability.
2. In fact, in addition to the above standard interpretation, central DP also offers the following stronger protection: The adversarially can be all other $T-1$ malicious users and even if they can collude adversarlly to induce the learning agent to reveal information about the reward of the remaining user, they cannot infer too much about the reward of the remaining user.
Further, if one considers replacing the reward at any $t$ to a special symbol to represent the event of removal of the corresponding user $t$ in the input sequences, then central DP also protects the information whether one user has participated in the learning process or not.
**A Concrete Example** We will use **dynamic pricing** as a concrete example scenario where the reward can be heavy-tailed and there exists a privacy leakage of the reward if no privacy protection is adopted.
*Scenario:* Online Retailer Selling Sensitive Products. The MAB learning agent sequentially chooses a action (price for the product) based on previous reward feedback (demand) so as to maximize the total expected revenue.
*Heavy-tailed Demand:* The demand for the product may exhibit a heavy-tailed pattern due to factors such as:
- Seasonal outbreaks leading to sudden spikes in demand.
- Public awareness campaigns or celebrity endorsements causing immediate interest.
- Regulatory changes making the product more accessible to a broader population.
*Privacy leakage:* Suppose the product is a specific medication used to treat a highly sensitive or stigmatized health condition. Thus, the particular demand of a user (the reward in MAB formulation) is highly sensitive. As discussed in [11, 12], an adversary might place orders immediately before and after a person of interest (i.e., target user) and if he sees a slight spike in his received prices, he might be able to infer the purchase decision (demand/reward) of the target user.
Please let us know if our clarifications help to resolve your concern and we are happy to engage more if there are any additional questions.