Summary
The paper propose a new model-based offline RL framework, called ARMOR, which can robustly learn policies that improve upon an reference policy by adversarially training a Markov decision process (MDP) model. ARMOR aims to optimize for the worst-case relative performance over uncertainty. In experiment, ARMOR implementation achieves good performance on D4RL benchmarks using only a single model.
Strengths
1. The idea is novel. The paper give us a new perspective to learn a dynamics model in offline RL, which is valuable to the community;
2. The paper is overall well-written and easy to follow for me;
3. The implementation is generally reasonble in intuition.
Weaknesses
1. The description in Section 4.1 is quite confusing, with many details tucked away in the appendix. This arrangement is not particularly reader-friendly. I suggest that the authors better link the following points: (1) why the objective in Line 228 can substitute for Eq. (1); (2) how Line 228 is transformed into the goal of Line 199 and Algorithm 1. You don't need to elaborate on the relationship, but at least some intuition or motivation should be provided to the reader. Additionally, an optional suggestion: the authors might consider restructuring the overall arrangement by first introducing the part of Line 228 and then describing how it is implemented, which may result in a more natural discourse.
2. The notation used for expressing errors is confusing here, with many instances of $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{L}$ representing loss, lacking in distinctiveness. A classic example is the symbols in Line 228, $\mathcal{E}\_{D}$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\hat D}$, both error symbols share the same structure, only the parameters differ. But they represent completely different losses, with the former being the maximum likelihood, and the latter the Bellman error. I suggest the authors revise the notations used, making it clear to readers what kind of loss it is without having to inspect the parameter differences.
3. Figure 2 could be further polished: Without reading the main text, readers would not understand why ARMOR chooses the two models on the right, as the figure (including the caption) does not demonstrate that the reference policy is actually moving rightward. I believe the authors could add this information, allowing readers to better grasp the authors' motivation.
3. Although D4RL is a fairly popular benchmark, I think the tasks from D4RL do not adequately highlight the advantages of the proposed algorithm. As the authors mentioned, this algorithm is motivated by real-world application scenarios, like "Usually, the systems we apply RL to have currently running policies, such as an engneeded autonomous driving rule or a heuristic-based system for diagnosis, and the goal of applying a learning algorithm is often to further improve upon these baseline reference policies...". However, the data in the selected D4RL datasets mostly come from mixed policies. The medium dataset aligns with this scenario, but the baselines already perform well, making it hard to discern the advantage of the proposed method. The recently released neorl [1] dataset might be more suitable for this work, as it was specifically designed for the scenarios the authors proposed, with all datasets collected by a single working policy, a concept similar to the authors' reference policy.
[1] NeoRL: A Near Real-World Benchmark for Offline Reinforcement Learning
Questions
The implementation of Equation (4) somewhat contradicts my intuition. Specifically,
- $M$'s initial goal was to enhance $\pi_{\rm ref}$'s $J$ and reduce $\pi$'s $J$. However, in the final implementation, none of $M$'s optimization aspects involve $\pi_{\rm ref}$. This makes it unclear how the losses employed in practice can meet the original optimization objective of Equation (1).
- I'm unclear on why the optimization process for the critic necessitates a pessimistic loss, e.g., $\mathcal{L}_{D_M}$? The need for pessimism about the critic's estimates isn't evident in the objective Equation (1).
In Table 1, I'm curious on why several cloned datasets don't work by ARMOR? This seems to be the datasets very suitable for ARMOR to show better performance.
In Figure 3, the algorithm shows sensitivity to $\beta$. It would be beneficial if the authors could elucidate the underlying reasons for this and provide any principles to guide researchers.
The experiments in Section 5.2 could be improved. The authors claim that "ARMOR can robustly learn policies that improve upon an arbitrary reference policy..." which is important. However, in the experiments, only performance improvements under a specific reference policy are demonstrated. It would be more constructive to verify this claim by picking various policies as reference policies and conduct experiments under one or two environments. I think DOPE [1] can be referenced as a work to conduct this experiment, which preserves many policies that can be used as reference policies.
Regarding related work, a discussion could be made with the work [2] that utilizes adversarial approaches for offline environment learning. The optimization objective of this work coincidently using an opposite objective to the Equation (1) of this paper for model learning, which is "$\max_M \min_\pi \ell(M, \pi)$".
Also suddenly inspired by the work [2], I would like to propose an open question for discussion: Can we also consider using adversarial policies further with ARMOR, such as $\max_\pi \min_M \max_{\pi_{\rm ref}}$? Since constructing $\pi_{\rm ref}$ from the offline data isn't a necessity, following Theorem 3, if we can create a sufficient number of $\pi_{\rm ref}$ in an adversarial manner, could we theoretically ensure that the final $\hat \pi$ approximates the optimal policy in any situation?
[1]Benchmarks for Deep Off-Policy Evaluation.
[2] Adversarial Counterfactual Environment Model Learning.
Rating
7: Accept: Technically solid paper, with high impact on at least one sub-area, or moderate-to-high impact on more than one areas, with good-to-excellent evaluation, resources, reproducibility, and no unaddressed ethical considerations.
Confidence
4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work.