Online Ad Procurement in Non-stationary Autobidding Worlds

Today's online advertisers procure digital ad impressions through interacting with autobidding platforms: advertisers convey high level procurement goals via setting levers such as budget, target return-on-investment, max cost per click, etc.. Then ads platforms subsequently procure impressions on advertisers' behalf, and report final procurement conversions (e.g. click) to advertisers. In practice, advertisers may receive minimal information on platforms' procurement details, and procurement outcomes are subject to non-stationary factors like seasonal patterns, occasional system corruptions, and market trends which make it difficult for advertisers to optimize lever decisions effectively. Motivated by this, we present an online learning framework that helps advertisers dynamically optimize ad platform lever decisions while subject to general long-term constraints in a realistic bandit feedback environment with non-stationary procurement outcomes. In particular, we introduce a primal-dual algorithm for online decision making with multi-dimension decision variables, bandit feedback and long-term uncertain constraints. We show that our algorithm achieves low regret in many worlds when procurement outcomes are generated through procedures that are stochastic, adversarial, adversarially corrupted, periodic, and ergodic, respectively, without having to know which procedure is the ground truth. Finally, we emphasize that our proposed algorithm and theoretical results extend beyond the applications of online advertising.

Paper

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Peer review

Reviewer bowu7/10 · confidence 4/52023-07-04

Summary

This work studies an advertiser's online high-dimensional lever decision problem with long-tern constraints under limited bandit feedback for different input models. The authors' main contributions include: (1) model formulation; (2) proposing an algorithm universally applicable to input models; (3) theoretical regret analysis. There is an advertiser that repeatedly interact with an ad platform during a time horizon $T$, aiming to maximize her total conversions subject to multiple constraints. At each time $t$, the advertiser need to make a multi-dimensional lever decision and observed her realized conversion as well as her multi-dimensional realized cost. The authors propose an algorithm with universally good performance and provide regret lower bounds of this problem with respect to different input procedures.

Strengths

1. The proposed algorithm is oblivious to input models such that it can achieve high performance without knowing which setting the decision-maker is in. 2. It is novel to adopt the random perturbation approach and the expert-based decision-making in online autobidding. The regret analysis requires non-trivial insights and techniques. Particularly, the proof of lemma 4.6 that bounds the primal ascent regret stands out from standard primal-dual frameworks. 3. The organization of this paper is great.

Weaknesses

1. The idea of solving a problem in many worlds is not new. In addition to commonly studied stochastic and adversarial input models, [1] also considers $\delta$-corrupted, periodic, ergodic input models. Actually, the proofs for the latter three cases are analogous to the stochastic case as they still assume stationary distributions to some extent. [1] Santiago Balseiro, Haihao Lu, and Vahab Mirrokni. The best of many worlds: Dual mirror descent for online allocation problems. 2. Some mistakes are spotted. Some statements are not clear enough. See the questions below.

Questions

1. Line 13, multi-dimension -> multi-dimensional. 2. Line 14. What does "uncertain" mean throughout this paper? The bidder should known their constraints at the beginning, e.g. known budget. 3. Line 168, a redundant "of". 4. Line 219, realzied -> realized. 5. Line 283, violates constraints violation? 6. Line 664, missing values for $a$ and $b$. 7. Line 288, what does $\alpha$ do in algorithm 1? To my understanding, it makes sure that the opinion of an expert lies in the interior of the domain. However, the value of $\alpha$ is not specified. It seems fatal if $\alpha$ is close to 1. 8. Line 299, the number of experts $N$ seems to be negative when $T$ goes to infinity. 9. Line 301, N experts or (N+1) experts? 10. Line 539, the first term in the RHS of equation (15) is not bounded after timing $T$. 11. Line 542, $\tau$ -> $t$. The authors should check $t\in [T]$ and $\tau\in [t]$ throughout the appendix. the order of $\beta$ also seems wrong in equation (16). 12. Line 626, observe that the sum operator is over $t\in [\tau_A]$ so the optimal $x$ does not vary to $t$. Does it implies all $y_t$ are the same? 13. Line 629, arer -> are. 14. Line 636, according to the theorem 4.2 one has $\gamma_{0} = K^{-1/6} (1+DT)^{1/2} T^{-3/4}$ and $\gamma_{N} = 1$. Then $\gamma_{0}$ is not the largest element in the stepsize set since it goes to $0$. Be willing to raise my rating if it is confirmed there is no technical flaw.

Rating

7: Accept: Technically solid paper, with high impact on at least one sub-area, or moderate-to-high impact on more than one areas, with good-to-excellent evaluation, resources, reproducibility, and no unaddressed ethical considerations.

Confidence

4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work.

Soundness

2 fair

Presentation

3 good

Contribution

3 good

Limitations

N/A

Reviewer EvVQ6/10 · confidence 3/52023-07-06

Summary

This work studies the problem of dynamic online allocation under constraints with bandit feedback, and derives a generic algorithm applicable to various input settings (stochastic, adversarial, $\delta$-corrupted, ergodic, periodic). It recovers regret rates close to those of the lower bounds in each of these settings. The algorithm uses a dual gradient descent over $\lambda_t$ to decouple the decisions over time by considering the lagrangian, a gradient ascent for the optimal choice of $x_t$ (that also uses the technique from Flaxman et al (2004) to handle the bandit feedback), and finally a multiplicative weight update to adapt the learning rates used to the correct input setting.

Strengths

- The algorithm generalizes to multiple input settings and general constraints the problems related to Bandits with knapsack constraints, and of online learning with constraints. (to be clear this is an important strength of this paper!) - The problem is well motivated through the consideration of running multiple ad campaigns

Weaknesses

- The assumption that there exists some safe action of level $\beta$ do simplify the problem of constraint satisfaction by guaranteeing to be able to satisfy the constraint at the end - Some of the upper bounds (stochastic, periodic, corrupted) are a bit loose compared to their respective lower bounds - The writing can be improved, in particular in the proofs which are lacking discussion about their main ideas and intuition. As an example page $8$ of the appendices is almost only a sequence of inequality and is hard to follow. For instance the inequalities could be cut in multiple parts, and some comments could be added to better explain the goal of the proof. There are also some typos.

Questions

- Do the $T^{2/3}$ rates come from the use of the method to handle bandit feedback? How would a generic gradient feedback affect the rates, would we be able to derive tight rates with respect to the lower bounds presented? I think it might have been better to first present the results with gradient feedback, and mention in the appendix that bandit feedback can be handled by a standard technique. This would allow the main part of the paper to focus on the new contributions. - Could you give some intuition on what this optimal dynamic sequence looks like in the various settings? For instance, if my understanding is correct, the optimal dynamic sequence in the stochastic setting is simply a unique point (because the data is i.i.d). Could the optimal sequence for the ergodic setting be a function of $\kappa$ close to the unique optimal point with respect to the stationary measure? - How much does the meta algorithm degrade the regret? (compared to assuming that we know the input setting) - l 657 Why is it $... +D \dots$ and not $...+(t-1)D\dots $ ? Comments/Typos: - L304 and l324 stochstic -> stochastic - I find the notation of $\lambda \in [0,F e/ \beta]$ confusing, is it $\lambda \in [0,F/\beta]^K$? - L553 ‘which states $\max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} f(x)$: is a word missing? - L608 I am not sure to understand this statement, could you include a reference for this result? Is the sup taken over $(g_{\tau},f_{\tau})$ - over $[t]$ or $[T]$? - I think it would be nice to cite the paper of Mannor et al (Online learning with sample path constraints), which deals with very similar problem and started the works on online convex optimization with varying constraints - Equation below l643: $v$ -> $\Vert v \Vert$, and the last equality should be an inequality (as it is in the ball, not the sphere) - Equation below l655 I think some of the gradients are missing $\Vert \nabla_t \Vert^2$ and $x^i_{t+}$ -> $\tilde{x}^{i}_{t}$. Why are some of the gradients bolded and not the others? - Same thing for the gradients below l657, in addition I am not sure where $P(y_1:T)$ is defined. - L 664 ‘$a=$ and $b=$’ it is unfinished I have not read through all the proofs, but I would recommend to read it again to look for additional typos

Rating

6: Weak Accept: Technically solid, moderate-to-high impact paper, with no major concerns with respect to evaluation, resources, reproducibility, ethical considerations.

Confidence

3: You are fairly confident in your assessment. It is possible that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work. Math/other details were not carefully checked.

Soundness

3 good

Presentation

2 fair

Contribution

3 good

Limitations

Yes the authors address some limitations in the section $5$ of the paper regarding the lower bounds.

Reviewer EvVQ2023-08-13

I thank the authors for their detailed and careful responses. If I understand correctly the reply regarding the safe action, this assumes that the budget scales with $T$ (e.g. $B=\rho T$), so that $g_t(x_t)=\text{cost}_t*x_t-\rho$ and thus $g_t(0)=-\rho<0$? If so then indeed it is reasonable; I think it would be nice to include the examples mentioned by the authors to justify the existence of such a safe action. I think the novelty of the technical contributions would be clearer if in the proof sketches this work was more directly compared to [9] and its proof techniques, as well as which arguments need special care in the combination of the bandit gradient estimation technique and the mirror descent for $\lambda_t$. Many typos were found in the proofs (in particular by reviewer bowu), and as such I will keep my current grade. Otherwise, all my questions have been clearly addressed. I believe that the paper should be accepted, assuming that the comparison with [9] is made clearer, and that this work is proofread again (including the appendix) to catch any additional typos.

Authorsrebuttal2023-08-15

Regarding your understanding/example for the safe action (in the case of budgets), you are completely correct. We will indeed include such examples in the revision of the paper to provide intuition for existence of the safe action. We will also present more comparisons with [9] in our revision to clearly convey our contributions and novelties, and will carefully review the paper to correct typos. Again, we sincerely thank the reviewer for taking the time to offer all the constructive feedback!

Reviewer hupT7/10 · confidence 4/52023-07-06

Summary

This paper concerns a two-stage autobidding scenario, such as an advertising platform environment. Each advertiser wants to maximize value received (e.g., clicks) subject to long-run constraints (e.g., budget or ROI). As actions, the advertiser can specify certain instructions to an autobidding agent (e.g., a spend rate or ROAS target) and observe the results. The advertiser observes bandit feedback, and wishes to tune their choice of actions/instructions to solve their long-run optimization problem. Because the autobidders themselves are learning over time and potentially facing changing market conditions, the evolution of payoffs observed by the advertiser may not be stationary. The paper considers a variety of different payoff evolution models, including partial adversarial corruption, periodic, and ergodic payoffs. The main result is a universal learning method for the advertiser that achieves good regret for each of these payoff evolution models. The idea is to combine dual descent methods for constraints with a modified online convex optimization approach to adequately explore lever decisions given the dual variables. This combination leads to vanishing regret in each of the settings considered. The resulting regret rates are then compared with known lower bounds for each of these settings (many of which apply in relaxed settings, such a full feedback rather than bandit feedback).

Strengths

I like this paper. The modeling framework that separates true "long-run" objectives from "short-term" directive levers is extremely natural and, as far as I'm aware, novel. It also tracks my understanding of how autobidding works in practice: advertisers need not keep their specified constraints (to the autobidder) fixed over time, but can manipulate them online as tunable knobs. The assumption of a safe action is likewise very reasonable, and the proposed algorithm makes use of it to good effect. The proposed algorithm combines multiple well-established ideas from the online optimization literature in a reasonable way. The fact that this comes together into a unifying framework is an appealing feature, as is the need for only bandit feedback. The regret rate suffers somewhat compared to known bounds, but not by too much --- what amounts to a rate of T^{3/4} for each of the non-fully-adversarial settings is quite good, while leaving room for future work to improve. Getting these regret rates down to sqrt{T} (or showing this isn't possible) is a nice open challenge.

Weaknesses

The biggest question for me is how "real" autobidding (e.g., competitive uniform bidding) falls into this scenario. For instance: even in a stationary environment in terms of competitors, the relationship between levers and outcomes is not necessarily stationary for advertiser i because the underlying autobidder is learning over time how best to satisfy the directive communicated by a given lever setting. So my understanding is that this scenario would fall under the ergodic setting. But what if the competitors are not stationary, but are learning as well? Can these theoretical frameworks be linked back to the motivating setting of autobidders that simultaneously learn? Either way, it would be nice to have a more thorough discussion of this in the body of the paper. Another potential weakness is that the technical contributions largely synthesizes known approaches, so the marginal technical contribution is not extremely high. I therefore view the conceptual and modeling contributions as the main selling points for the submission.

Questions

Are there natural conditions under which a scenario with mutually competing autobidders would fall into one of the analyzed worlds?

Rating

7: Accept: Technically solid paper, with high impact on at least one sub-area, or moderate-to-high impact on more than one areas, with good-to-excellent evaluation, resources, reproducibility, and no unaddressed ethical considerations.

Confidence

4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work.

Soundness

4 excellent

Presentation

4 excellent

Contribution

3 good

Limitations

I feel that the paper is sufficiently up-front about its limitations, and the authors do an adequate job of describing what their paper does and does not do.

Reviewer g73L6/10 · confidence 3/52023-07-10

Summary

The paper proposes a universally constrained online learning framework for ad procurement in non-stationary autobidding worlds. The paper makes contributions to the field by addressing the challenges of ad procurement in non-stationary autobidding worlds and developing a unified algorithm that can perform well in autobidding world while satisfying long-term constraints.

Strengths

- The paper addresses the challenges of ad procurement in non-stationary autobidding worlds and develops a unified algorithm that can perform well in autobidding world while satisfying long-term constraints. - The paper makes contributions to the field by developing an algorithm that yields good performance guarantees under different procedures. - The paper is well-written and clearly presents the problem and the proposed solution.

Weaknesses

- The paper does not have experiments to validate the theoretical findings. - The paper could provide more insights into the practical implications of the proposed algorithm and how it can be applied in real-world settings.

Questions

What are the challenges with applying the algorithm to obtain experimental results?

Rating

6: Weak Accept: Technically solid, moderate-to-high impact paper, with no major concerns with respect to evaluation, resources, reproducibility, ethical considerations.

Confidence

3: You are fairly confident in your assessment. It is possible that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work. Math/other details were not carefully checked.

Soundness

3 good

Presentation

3 good

Contribution

3 good

Limitations

Yes.

Reviewer hupT2023-08-11

Dear authors, Thank you for the thorough response. Your point about the difficulties in extending to a fully game-theoretic setup is well-taken. I am happy to hear about your plan to include a discussion about these connections. Your response about the relationship to [R4] was very helpful. I agree with your assessment of the additional challenges; your note about the bandit feedback setup is especially clear in this regard. I agree that the practicality/implementability afforded by this setup is a strength.

Reviewer bowu2023-08-18

Line 634-635. With the new definition of $N_t$, how do you get the result of equation (38) by using equation (39)? By the choice of $\gamma_i$, $$O\left(\frac{1+P}{\gamma_i}\right) = O((1+P)^{1/2} \cdot T^{3/4}) \leq O(T^{1/2} \cdot T^{3/4}),$$ which is greater than $O(T)$.

Authorsrebuttal2023-08-20

We apologize for the lack of clarity here which is related to the earlier typos pointed in the review, and we remark that the final regret bound should indeed be $(1-1/\chi)OPT + T^{3/4}\sqrt{P}$ as pointed out by the reviewer. Despite the fact that when $P$ is at least the order of $\sqrt{T}$ we get $T^{3/4}\sqrt{P} \geq O(T)$ which leads to a non-meaningful regret bound, we remark that to the best of our knowledge even in the no-constraint setting, there does not exist any algorithm that is able to remove the term $T^{3/4}\sqrt{P}$ in the bandit, multi-dimensional, single-point feedback online optimization setup with dynamic regret (see detailed discussion in Remark 4 of [R1]). The most widely studied approach to achieve a sharper bound involves querying twice each round (i.e. two-pointed feedback) but this is not the practical setup we consider in the paper in the context of online advertising. Further, as described in [R1], the term $P$ can be viewed as a problem instance-dependent factor that measures the hardness of the problem. Note that the term $(1-1/\chi)OPT $ is the regret lower bound and unavoidable [R2], and our bound still bears value in the case where $P = o(\sqrt{T})$. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this adversarial bound is not satisfactory, and we believe that a key future direction would be to improve this bound. Finally, we will definitely add more discussions in the paper on the limitations of our bounds to the adversarial setup, and complement the paper with numerical studies to illustrate that our algorithm performs well in practical settings. [R1] Zhao, Peng, et al. "Bandit convex optimization in non-stationary environments." The Journal of Machine Learning Research. [R2] Balseiro, Santiago R., Haihao Lu, and Vahab Mirrokni. "The best of many worlds: Dual mirror descent for online allocation problems." Operations Research

Reviewer bowu2023-08-21

Thanks for the authors' detailed and careful responses. All my concerns have been clearly addressed. By the result of [R2], $O(T^{3/4}(1+P)^{1/2})$ is almost the best we can get for one-point feedback. Even under two-point feedback, as the lower bound is $\Omega(\sqrt{TP})$, one has to consider $P=o(T)$ to ensure the convergence of long-term performance in the adversarial setting. By the result of [R2], $\xi$ is the best competitive ratio we can get. Now I regard $(1-1/\xi)\mathrm{OPT} + O(T^{3/4}(1+P)^{1/2})$ as a standard and reasonable regret bound. However, the current submission gives me a feeling that the authors are hiding it on purpose. This technical detail is actually very important and must be written explicitly wherever the bound is mentioned, namely Table 1 and Theorem 4.2, to properly reflect the contribution of this paper. More discussions in section 5 that involve the bounds in [R1] can help justify this result. I have decided to give this work a higher rating. But the authors really need to proofread this paper again. I'm sure there must be many other typos that haven't been caught by me or the other reviewers.

Program Chairsdecision2023-09-21

Decision

Accept (poster)

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