Summary
This paper concerns a two-stage autobidding scenario, such as an advertising platform environment. Each advertiser wants to maximize value received (e.g., clicks) subject to long-run constraints (e.g., budget or ROI). As actions, the advertiser can specify certain instructions to an autobidding agent (e.g., a spend rate or ROAS target) and observe the results. The advertiser observes bandit feedback, and wishes to tune their choice of actions/instructions to solve their long-run optimization problem.
Because the autobidders themselves are learning over time and potentially facing changing market conditions, the evolution of payoffs observed by the advertiser may not be stationary. The paper considers a variety of different payoff evolution models, including partial adversarial corruption, periodic, and ergodic payoffs.
The main result is a universal learning method for the advertiser that achieves good regret for each of these payoff evolution models. The idea is to combine dual descent methods for constraints with a modified online convex optimization approach to adequately explore lever decisions given the dual variables. This combination leads to vanishing regret in each of the settings considered. The resulting regret rates are then compared with known lower bounds for each of these settings (many of which apply in relaxed settings, such a full feedback rather than bandit feedback).
Strengths
I like this paper. The modeling framework that separates true "long-run" objectives from "short-term" directive levers is extremely natural and, as far as I'm aware, novel. It also tracks my understanding of how autobidding works in practice: advertisers need not keep their specified constraints (to the autobidder) fixed over time, but can manipulate them online as tunable knobs.
The assumption of a safe action is likewise very reasonable, and the proposed algorithm makes use of it to good effect.
The proposed algorithm combines multiple well-established ideas from the online optimization literature in a reasonable way. The fact that this comes together into a unifying framework is an appealing feature, as is the need for only bandit feedback. The regret rate suffers somewhat compared to known bounds, but not by too much --- what amounts to a rate of T^{3/4} for each of the non-fully-adversarial settings is quite good, while leaving room for future work to improve. Getting these regret rates down to sqrt{T} (or showing this isn't possible) is a nice open challenge.
Weaknesses
The biggest question for me is how "real" autobidding (e.g., competitive uniform bidding) falls into this scenario. For instance: even in a stationary environment in terms of competitors, the relationship between levers and outcomes is not necessarily stationary for advertiser i because the underlying autobidder is learning over time how best to satisfy the directive communicated by a given lever setting. So my understanding is that this scenario would fall under the ergodic setting. But what if the competitors are not stationary, but are learning as well? Can these theoretical frameworks be linked back to the motivating setting of autobidders that simultaneously learn? Either way, it would be nice to have a more thorough discussion of this in the body of the paper.
Another potential weakness is that the technical contributions largely synthesizes known approaches, so the marginal technical contribution is not extremely high. I therefore view the conceptual and modeling contributions as the main selling points for the submission.
Questions
Are there natural conditions under which a scenario with mutually competing autobidders would fall into one of the analyzed worlds?
Rating
7: Accept: Technically solid paper, with high impact on at least one sub-area, or moderate-to-high impact on more than one areas, with good-to-excellent evaluation, resources, reproducibility, and no unaddressed ethical considerations.
Confidence
4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work.
Limitations
I feel that the paper is sufficiently up-front about its limitations, and the authors do an adequate job of describing what their paper does and does not do.