WaveAttack: Asymmetric Frequency Obfuscation-based Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Neural Networks

Due to the popularity of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology, numerous backdoor attacks are designed by adversaries to mislead deep neural network predictions by manipulating training samples and training processes. Although backdoor attacks are effective in various real scenarios, they still suffer from the problems of both low fidelity of poisoned samples and non-negligible transfer in latent space, which make them easily detectable by existing backdoor detection algorithms. To overcome the weakness, this paper proposes a novel frequency-based backdoor attack method named WaveAttack, which obtains image high-frequency features through Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to generate backdoor triggers. Furthermore, we introduce an asymmetric frequency obfuscation method, which can add an adaptive residual in the training and inference stage to improve the impact of triggers and further enhance the effectiveness of WaveAttack. Comprehensive experimental results show that WaveAttack not only achieves higher stealthiness and effectiveness, but also outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) backdoor attack methods in the fidelity of images by up to 28.27\% improvement in PSNR, 1.61\% improvement in SSIM, and 70.59\% reduction in IS.

Paper

Similar papers

Peer review

Reviewer gVJn7/10 · confidence 3/52024-07-06

Summary

This paper introduces a backdoor attack that leverages DWT to create highly stealthy backdoor triggers, named WaveAttack. The attack employs an asymmetric frequency obfuscation technique to improve the impact and effectiveness of these triggers during both training and inference stages.

Strengths

The work’s proposal and clear reasonings to use DWT instead of other frequency-based transformations creates backdoor triggers that are highly stealthy. The perceptibility of the triggers generated are validated across numerous image fidelity metrics.

Weaknesses

The frequency-based transformation, DWT, is the major contribution of this paper’s proposed attack. But the paper only experiments with the “Haar” wavelet, when there are dozens of different variations available.

Questions

1. Can the method be adapted to other types of wavelet transforms, and how would this affect the attack's effectiveness and stealthiness? 2. While the authors explain the rationale behind them choosing DWT over DCT, there are no experiments detailing the superiority of DWT. Can DCT/DFT or other forms of frequency-based transformations work in this proposed method? Can they be swapped-in directly?

Rating

7

Confidence

3

Soundness

3

Presentation

4

Contribution

3

Limitations

See weaknesses and questions.

Reviewer h6uR4/10 · confidence 4/52024-07-07

Summary

This paper proposes a novel frequency-based backdoor attack method named WaveAttack, which can effectively generate the backdoor residuals for the high-frequency component based on DWT, thus ensuring the high fidelity of poisoned samples.

Strengths

1. The paper is well-written and well-structured. 2. Extensive experiments are conducted to validate the attack method. 3 The performance of the attack is surprising.

Weaknesses

The paper is well-written and includes sufficient experiments. However, I am concerned about the limited novelty of this work, as there are already several backdoor attacks [1-4] based on the frequency domain that have been proposed. These works leverage different components/ranges in the frequency domain, and typically, [4] also uses a high-frequency trigger. While the design is different, the high-level ideas are quite similar. References: [1] Feng Y, Ma B, Zhang J, et al. Fiba: Frequency-injection based backdoor attack in medical image analysis[C]//Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 2022: 20876-20885. [2] Wang T, Yao Y, Xu F, et al. Backdoor attack through frequency domain[J]. arXiv preprint arXiv:2111.10991, 2021. [3] Check your other door! creating backdoor attacks in the frequency domain. [4] Zeng Y, Park W, Mao Z M, et al. Rethinking the backdoor attacks' triggers: A frequency perspective[C]//Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF international conference on computer vision. 2021: 16473-16481. Minor Points: 1. In section 3.2, the authors mention decomposing the image into four components: LL, LH, HL, HH. Since this is a key idea of the paper, it would be beneficial to explain their meanings and possibly show some examples in the Appendix. 2. In Figure 2, the authors use "encoder" and "decoder," but in the text, they use "generator." It would be better to be consistent with terminology. 3. Asymmetric frequency obfuscation is an important method in this paper. It would be better to describe/introduce it and its motivation in detail earlier in the paper.

Questions

Please See Above.

Rating

4

Confidence

4

Soundness

3

Presentation

3

Contribution

1

Limitations

Yes

Reviewer vbLQ4/10 · confidence 4/52024-07-12

Summary

This paper investigated the backdoor attack, aiming at improving the fidelity of poisoned samples. A novel frequency-based backdoor attack method named WaveAttack is proposed to generate highly stealthy backdoor triggers. The experiments show that the poisoned images generated by WaveAttack can achieve high attack effectiveness and fidelity.

Strengths

The proposed attack creates more high-fidelity poisoned samples through Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), meanwhile maintaining the attack success rate.

Weaknesses

[Threat model] The threat model illustrated in Section 3.1 is unclear. In the implementation, WaveAttack requires that the attacker fully controls the training process. Therefore, the statement “They can embed backdoors into the DNNs by poisoning the given training dataset” is ambiguous. [Stealthiness] I recommend that the authors conduct more experiments to confirm the advantage of WaveAttack in terms of attack stealthiness. As shown in Figure 3, the difference between FTrojan and WaveAttack is negligible. [Baselines] Most baselines are poisoning-based backdoor attacks, e.g., Adapt-Blend and WaNet. It is not fair to compare WaveAttack with these poisoning-based attacks.

Questions

The threat model is unclear. The stealthiness of the attack should be further confirmed. More comparable baselines should be included, such as LIRA [1]. [1] LIRA: Learnable, Imperceptible and Robust Backdoor Attacks. ICCV, 2021.

Rating

4

Confidence

4

Soundness

2

Presentation

3

Contribution

2

Limitations

The authors adequately discuss the potential security issues related to the proposed backdoor attack. Also, the limitations of the proposed method in terms of computing cost have been mentioned.

Reviewer h6uR2024-08-11

Reply to the rebuttal.

Thanks to the authors for the detailed rebuttal. I appreciate the effort and work put into this paper. While the performance does show improvement over previous frequency-based methods, the use of another off-the-shelf algorithm to generate high-frequency components (instead of DCT or Fourier Transformation), though effective, may not fully meet the novelty expectations for a NeurIPS submission. Therefore, I will give at most my current score.

Authorsrebuttal2024-08-11

We sincerely appreciate the reviewer’s enthusiastic and generous responses. We would like to highlight that our contribution extends beyond merely utilising the DWT method. Specifically, this paper is the first to propose an asymmetric frequency obfuscation method within DWT-based frequency backdoor attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this introduction of the obfuscation method on DWT **enables the frequency-domain-based backdoor attack method to evade the defences of three kinds of detection methods** (sample-quality-based detection methods, latent-space-based detection methods, and frequency-domain-based detection methods) **simultaneously for the first time**.

Authorsrebuttal2024-08-11

# Response to Ethics Reviewer SALZ We sincerely thank the reviewer for thoughtful and forward-thinking insights into the potential risks of the proposed method. We fully acknowledge that as computing resources become more accessible and AI/ML technologies continue to advance, the feasibility of proposed backdoor attacks may increase, posing greater potential risks to DNN models. In response to the reviewer's recommendation, we agree that a more thorough discussion of these issues is necessary. Therefore, we will introduce a new subsection in Section 6.4, "Broader Impacts and Limitations", dedicated to exploring the potential risks associated with this attack and the need for further research on detection strategies based on the frequency-domain-based backdoor detection methods. We would like to emphasize that our paper mainly focuses on introducing and evaluating the attack method. This paper aims to **develop more powerful detection and defence mechanisms against such advanced backdoor attacks by proposing more advanced backdoor attack methods** and **address the weaknesses of state-of-the-art defence methods** in future works.

Reviewer vbLQ2024-08-14

Thank the authors for their response. However, I am still concerned about the slight improvement compared to the previous SOTAs, and also the novelty of this paper mentioned by Reviewer h6uR. Therefore, I tend to keep my initial score.

Authorsrebuttal2024-08-14

Dear reviewer, Thanks for your reply. We still want to clarify two things in our discussion. ### **Significant Improvement Over State-of-the-art Methods** Compared to the state-of-the-art methods, LIRA and FTrojan, the performance improvement of WaveAttack is **significant**. For instance, WaveAttack maintains excellent BA performance of backdoored DNNs while achieving 100% ASR for three datasets, whereas **LIRA's BA performance of backdoored DNNs on GTSRB drops to only 10.47%**. Moreover, neither of these attacks considers the existence of latent-space-based detection methods, making them vulnerable to such defences, which can fully resist FTrojan and LIRA. ### **Contributions** Regarding the novelty of this paper, we would like to emphasize that we are the first to propose an **asymmetric frequency obfuscation method** within DWT-based frequency backdoor attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this obfuscation method allows frequency-domain-based backdoor attacks to evade detection by three different types of methods (sample-quality-based, latent-space-based, and frequency-domain-based detection methods) **simultaneously for the first time**. Thank you very much for your review. If you have any further comments or questions, please feel free to contact us. Best regards, Authors

Program Chairsdecision2024-09-25

Decision

Accept (poster)

© 2026 NYSGPT2525 LLC