Summary
This paper investigates the reliability of methods for imperceptibly perturbing images to degrade the performance of latent diffusion models for style mimicry or editing. The authors observe that imperceptible perturbations designed to hamper diffusion-based image generation systems often result in perceptible artifacts when the “protected” image is reconstructed with a diffusion model. Noting that unprotected images typically do not exhibit such behavior, the authors propose a “purification” method in which images are optimized with respect to both a consistency objective (such that diffusion reconstruction preserves the purified image) and a similarity objective (such that purification does not perceptibly alter the image). The proposed purification method effectively mitigates two recent imperceptible perturbation methods for image editing and style transfer, indicating that stronger techniques are needed to protect image data from unwanted diffusion-based manipulation.
Strengths
The issue of protecting intellectual property such as images from unauthorized use by the operators of generative models is timely and significant.
The proposed purification approach — essentially an image adversarial attack using a simple encoder-decoder consistency objective, projected gradient descent, and Gaussian perturbation initialization — appears straightforward to implement, and is effective in both fine-tuned style mimicry and one-shot image editing scenarios.
The authors evaluate their purification method against adaptive perturbations optimized with knowledge of the purification objective and find their method still remains effective
The authors include reasonable protection methods (GLAZE, Photoguard) and purification baselines (JPEG compression, Gaussian noise, resizing) in their experiments.
Weaknesses
Figures 1 and 4 are unnecessarily hard to read. For the style mimicking experiments, the labels for each column ("clean image", "protected image", "purified image") misleadingly indicate that the images below are actual clean/protected/purified images from the dataset when in fact they appear to be images generated by a model fine-tuned on either clean, protected, or purified images. For the editing experiment, it would be better to actually show the input clean/protected/purified image in addition to the edited versions. This might require a tweak to the figure format or perhaps separate figures, but I think that more legible figures would better communicate the authors' proposed approach.
To justify the choice of tasks on which the proposed method is evaluated, the authors should more clearly indicate that they evaluate against two recent imperceptible protection methods on the specific tasks for which these protections methods were proposed. Otherwise, the choice of task (e.g. background editing) could come off as arbitrary.
The size of the experiment datasets are not stated (e.g. for style mimicry, the number of images per artist is given, but not the number of artists). The total number of samples evaluated should be given for both experiments.
Adaptive protection results are shown only for style mimicry, not editing.
The authors do not appear to discuss the runtime / computational complexity of their purification method.
In apparent contradiction with the authors' response to the NeurIPS checklist, compute details appear to be missing from the paper and appendix.
For the experiments section, the image examples are currently more compelling than the metrics. For the image editing task, it is not clear from Table 2 how much "better" the purified images fare than protected images -- e.g., how significant is a PSNR value of 15 vs. 14? Is there a value below which an attempted edit can be considered a failure? Without context, it is hard to get a sense of the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The classifier metrics for the style mimicry experiment are clearer, but still do not take into account many aspects of generated image quality (e.g. adherence to the prompt beyond style). A human subjects study assessing the quality and "correctness" of images generated in each task for the clean/protected/purified conditions would be much more persuasive.
The evaluation tasks appear to involve image models that operate under different "control" paradigms -- fine-tuning and text-prompting in the case of style mimicry, and one-shot image-conditioning and text-prompting in the case of background editing. This difference seems significant in that in the former case, purification must mitigate the influence of protective perturbations on the training process while in the latter case, purification must only mitigate the influence of protective perturbations on a forward pass through the diffusion model. I think this distinction between experimental tasks should be emphasized because (a) it is not immediately clear in the paper, and (b) because it is possible this could be framed as a strength of the proposed method (i.e. operating in distinct tasks/settings).
Questions
It is interesting that the simple consistency objective is sufficient to defeat protective perturbations, especially when optimized only with knowledge of the image encoder and decoder. Does this result imply that existing protection approaches primarily leverage the image encoder and decoder rather than the latent diffusion model itself? It would also be interesting to see whether there are other efficient ways to approximately optimize through the latent diffusion process.
(The following is more of a thought / comment than a question). In the adversarial example literature, methods have been proposed to tackle optimization with respect to competing objectives (e.g. perturbation effectiveness and imperceptibility). Often, one objective dominates the optimization even when loss values are scaled with well-chosen weights, leading to poor results and inaccurate estimates of robustness. The method of Bryniarski et al. [1] seems to be effective in allowing adaptive adversaries to better balance multiple constraints. Such an approach might lead to more effective balancing of the similarity and consistency objectives not just for the IMPRESS purification method, but for an adaptive adversary like the one proposed in section 5.4 of the paper. I think the simple projected gradient descent method and loss formulation the authors propose in this paper is fine -- it shows the effectiveness of the core idea without the need for extensive tweaks -- but it would also be interesting to see future work incorporate more recent techniques from adversarial machine learning into the protection and purification methods.
[1] Bryniarski, Oliver and Hingun, Nabeel and Pachuca, Pedro and Wang, Vincent and Carlini, Nicholas. "Evading Adversarial Example Detection Defenses with Orthogonal Projected Gradient Descent." ICLR 2022.
Rating
7: Accept: Technically solid paper, with high impact on at least one sub-area, or moderate-to-high impact on more than one areas, with good-to-excellent evaluation, resources, reproducibility, and no unaddressed ethical considerations.
Confidence
4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work.