Summary
This studies the adversarial robustness of image classifiers in the setting of continual learning. The aim is to maintain the adversarial robustness across a series of tasks as the model continues to learn on the new tasks. It proposes a method to stabilize the sample gradients smoothed by defense algorithms such as IGR and AT on previous tasks.
Strengths
1. Adversarial robustness in continual learning is a meaningful direction to explore and it has been less explored before.
2. Based on the given results, the proposed method seem to be effective. However, the reliability of conducted evaluation may be problematic as analyzed below.
Weaknesses
1. The presentation is hard to follow. For example, the section 3 starts with a subsection named "Constraint on Weight Updates" without any explanation or context like what this subsection is about, why here.
2. Several important discussions are missing. First, the authors claim as a contribution introducing the problem of robust continual learning, however, this setting is not formally defined in the paper. Second, the proposed method hypothesizes that "if we can stabilize the sample gradients smoothed by defense algorithms such as IGR and AT on previous tasks, the adversarial robustness of the neural network will hold even after its weights update for learning a sequence of new tasks." However, no discussion is provided to explain why.
3. In the experiments, an independent first layer was assigned to each task. Is this necessary for the proposed method? If so, this complicates the method and restricts its application scenarios.
4. The main result is based on the defense algorithm IGR which, however, is dated, so the result may not reflect the state-of-the-art. Besides, regularization-based defense like IGR is less effective than adversarial training defense according to the results on RobustBench. Therefore, I feel reporting main results on IGR is less meaningful.
5. The reported results seem to be promblematic. According to Tab. 4 in appendix, the perturbation budget is 2/255 for AutoAttack and 4/255 for PGD and FGSM on Split-CIFAR100 and Split-miniImageNet. Given the great difference in the budget, the robust accuracy evaluated by them should also exhibit obvious gap. However, as shown in 3rd row in Fig.3, such gap is not observed. Moreover, PGD is a much stronger than FGSM so the robust accuracy evaluated by PGD should be lower than that of FGSM. However, again in the same row and figure, PGD accuracy is higher than FGSM accuracy. Overall, I feel that the aversarial evaluation in this work is not reliable.
6. The discussion of related works is insufficient, covering only one related work and two surveys. It misses some related works, e.g., alternative formulation of adversarial continual learning [1], zero-shot and few-shot adversarial robustness [2, 3].
[1] Zhou, Yuhang, and Zhongyun Hua. "Defense without Forgetting: Continual Adversarial Defense with Anisotropic & Isotropic Pseudo Replay." Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 2024.
[2] Li, Lin, et al. "One prompt word is enough to boost adversarial robustness for pre-trained vision-language models." Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 2024.
[3] Mao, Chengzhi, et al. "Understanding Zero-shot Adversarial Robustness for Large-Scale Models." The Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations. 2023.
Questions
1. at Line 309, AT is cited to the publication "Adversarial examples in the physical world". To my best knowledge, that publication does not give an algorithm of adversarial training. It is also not a common citation of AT.