Summary
This paper presents an evaluation suite testing language models for the "representativeness heuristic" cognitive bias. It reviews six types of this heuristic, with illustrations, detailed descriptions, and examples, and reviews the results of testing LMs for these biases. The paper includes results for:
* Four LLMs,
* four prompting approaches,
* varying numbers of few-shot examples,
* correctness of the models' reasoning,
* two methods of 'hinting' the models, and
* two easier sets of related questions ("SPQs" and "IQs") testing necessary knowledge for solving the problems.
These experiments show that LMs exhibit qualitatively similar behavior to humans on such questions.
Reasons to accept
This is an interesting and well-executed study of LM reasoning. The paper is super well written and clear, focusing clearly on a question and testing it thoroughly. Lots of extra details are given in the appendix. This is probably a good evaluation to add to the long running list of interesting LM evaluations to run on frontier models. Lots of different settings are tried and tested and results are reported super clearly and legibly. I appreciate the text coloring and sizing in the tables. Overall just a nice paper.
Reasons to reject
Definitely not worth rejecting over, but I think what would really improve this paper a lot is spending some time discussing construct validity and external validity. Why are we testing models for these kinds of biases? What do we conclude about them when they get these results?
With humans, results on these tests may be taken to be indicative of broader reasoning patterns outside of the testing setting. But we already know that can be pretty problematic — psychology tests are run on a select group of people in a very artificial environment, subjects generally try to perform the way they think they are expected to perform, and the results may not be representative of how people act in the real world (See [this paper](https://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~schaller/528Readings/Rozin2001.pdf) for a nice discussion of this in the context of social psych). So there are important caveats to these kinds of results, but we take them seriously because of what we understand about the mental processes behind human decision making.
We do not have a comparable understanding of LM decision making, into which we do not have introspection, and which is much less consistent and systematic than human decision making. So what does it mean that LMs respond like humans do? Perhaps it just means they were trained on human cognitive bias tests, and any other place where they are presented with the opportunity to do such reasoning, they will behave very differently! Or perhaps these biases will show up in quite a different way when the LM is presented with a more complex or compound problem to solve, and its implicit reasoning won't follow the same patterns. It's really hard to say how these kinds of tests generalize to explain human behavior more broadly, and the case is much, much harder for LMs.
Not to say it's not worth doing and trying, but I think this is an important scientific consideration and a serious limitation of this kind of study, and I think the paper would be much better if it addressed it carefully.
Questions to authors
* More of a comment: the base rate fallacy picture doesn't seem to be a great example of the fallacy. Would be nice if you could illustrate it there too. Unless I'm missing something?
* The caption on the Disjunction Fallacy image is ungrammatical.