Summary
In this paper, the authors propose adversarial training for the task of 3D pose transfer using a novel architecture based on multi-scale MAE and channel-wise attention in the decoder. In particular, they rely on dynamic adversarial samples-based data augmentation (computed on the fly for every batch) to conduct adversarial training. The authors empirically validate the benefit of their proposed approach on three datasets and show that their method outperforms the considered baselines.
Strengths
- The presentation of the paper is good.
- Individual components in the proposed architecture are detailed sufficiently.
Weaknesses
- Limited novelty, as both components, MAE and adversarial training, are well-known in the literature. In particular, the adversarial training performed in the current setting is well-known in image classification literature where the adversarial samples are generated for every batch.
- The core novel additions in the current paper are multi-scale MAE and channel-wise attention in the decoding block. Although, these provide benefit in performance, frameworks such as Multi-scale MAE has already been proposed in literature [a].
- Besides, evaluation against adversarial attacks is incomplete (only considering white-box attacks).
- There is no proper related work section in the paper. For instance, it is difficult for the reader to understand the considered baselines such as NPT, GC-transformer, and the critical differences. Table 4 is helpful, but the authors should consider adding a section after the introduction. I suggest adding a related work section on 3D pose transfer methods, 3D pose data augmentation methods, and 3D adversarial training and defenses. In the current version, the related work is quite sparse.
References:
a. Zhang, R., Guo, Z., Gao, P., Fang, R., Zhao, B., Wang, D., ... & Li, H. (2022). Point-m2ae: multi-scale masked autoencoders for hierarchical point cloud pre-training. Advances in neural information processing systems, 35, 27061-27074.
Questions
- Please clarify the attack performed in Table 2 for evaluation against adversarial samples. Is this a FGM or PGD attack?
- In Table 2, what is the performance of adversarial training on the clean samples? Do you observe a standard accuracy-robustness tradeoff in this task?
- My other concern is that FGSM+AT is shown to be vulnerable to PGD attacks and also leads to catastrophic overfitting (CO) during training [a]. As such, several improvements [b,c,d, e] to FGSM+AT have been studied to enhance performance against adversarial attacks. In my view, the authors should carefully assess the robustness of FGSM+AT against strong attacks and also clarify categorically if they observed CO during training
- What is the performance on clean and adversarial samples with different attacking budgets in FGM training? How to set this attack budget to achieve the proper balance between performance on clean and adversarial samples?
- Authors should conduct an ablation with more advanced data-augmentation strategies to understand the true benefit from adversarial training (AT). Maybe adding noise to the input during training can also be considered as a way to decrease overfitting. There are also advanced pose augmentation methods such as [f] and maybe even more advanced ones. The authors should benchmark against these augmentation strategies and show the benefits of AT compared to them.
Overall, the paper lacks thorough evaluation with strong data augmentation schemes with training on the clean samples, nor does it show that the proposed adversarial training (AT) is robust to the strongest of the attacks.
a. Rice, L., Wong, E., & Kolter, Z. (2020, November). Overfitting in adversarially robust deep learning. In International Conference on Machine Learning (pp. 8093-8104). PMLR.
b. Andriushchenko, M., & Flammarion, N. (2020). Understanding and improving fast adversarial training. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 33, 16048-16059.
c. Vivek, B. S., & Babu, R. V. (2020, June). Single-step adversarial training with dropout scheduling. In 2020 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (pp. 947-956). IEEE.
d. Li, B., Wang, S., Jana, S., & Carin, L. (2020). Towards understanding fast adversarial training. arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.03089.
e. Kim, H., Lee, W., & Lee, J. (2021, May). Understanding catastrophic overfitting in single-step adversarial training. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 35, No. 9, pp. 8119-8127).
f. Gong, K., Zhang, J., & Feng, J. (2021). Poseaug: A differentiable pose augmentation framework for 3d human pose estimation. In Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision and pattern recognition (pp. 8575-8584).
Rating
5: marginally below the acceptance threshold
Confidence
4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that you did not understand some parts of the submission or that you are unfamiliar with some pieces of related work.