Fairness-Aware Meta-Learning via Nash Bargaining

To address issues of group-level fairness in machine learning, it is natural to adjust model parameters based on specific fairness objectives over a sensitive-attributed validation set. Such an adjustment procedure can be cast within a meta-learning framework. However, naive integration of fairness goals via meta-learning can cause hypergradient conflicts for subgroups, resulting in unstable convergence and compromising model performance and fairness. To navigate this issue, we frame the resolution of hypergradient conflicts as a multi-player cooperative bargaining game. We introduce a two-stage meta-learning framework in which the first stage involves the use of a Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to resolve hypergradient conflicts and steer the model toward the Pareto front, and the second stage optimizes with respect to specific fairness goals. Our method is supported by theoretical results, notably a proof of the NBS for gradient aggregation free from linear independence assumptions, a proof of Pareto improvement, and a proof of monotonic improvement in validation loss. We also show empirical effects across various fairness objectives in six key fairness datasets and two image classification tasks.

Paper

Similar papers

Peer review

Reviewer RvEe6/10 · confidence 3/52024-07-11

Summary

This paper tried to address the problem of hypergradient conflicts in fairness-aware meta-learning, where the overall validation loss gradient is not aligned with per-group validation loss. They do this by using Nash Bargaining to allow the different groups to achieve consensus on the gradient update direction. Their approach is to have a two-stage solution, where initial rounds of optimization drive the solution to a pareto front, following which they optimize for fairness. They show useful properties of this approach, including non-reliance on the linear independence assumption previously used in NBS-based gradient aggregation. Finally, they show empirical results in multiple datasets by adding their two-stage approach to existing algorithms, showing improvement in multiple domains.

Strengths

The paper is well-written. The visualizations for their experiments are able to convey a lot of information in a small figure, and decently complement the claims of the paper, allowing readers to intuitively understand what the approach is doing. They derive a closed-form update rule for the weights resulting from the Nash bargaining. The problem being tackled is also significant, adding weight to the contributions of the paper.

Weaknesses

1. It is not very clear to me when the algorithm should move onto the second stage. How is the threshold number of steps determined before moving from the Nash bargaining to optimizing fairness? Or are both steps always performed? Some text makes it seem like they happen independently, but this is not clear from the description of the method, or through the algorithm. 2. The histograms (e.g. Figure 1, right) are unclear. Are the two colors ever overlapping? If they are disjoint, why is that the case? If they do overlap, there should be some indication of the hidden bars.

Questions

1. Please address the questions from the weaknesses section. 2. Since the closed-form update is identical to previous work, is the only novelty the removal of the linear independence assumption? Do previous methods' results also match what this paper's experimental section shows?

Rating

6

Confidence

3

Soundness

3

Presentation

4

Contribution

3

Limitations

Yes

Reviewer RvEe2024-08-07

Thanks for the response and clarifications. I would recommend that the new contributions be better highlighted to make them clear, and that the other changes be included as well.

Authorsrebuttal2024-08-08

Of course! We will highlight the theoretical contributions and incorporate other changes as suggested. Thank you for helping us to improve the paper!

Reviewer hQxX7/10 · confidence 3/52024-07-12

Summary

This paper studies fair prediction tasks where fairness is defined on some partition of the data points into groups (by gender or race, for examples). The paper studies a meta-learning framework that only needs access to group labels for the validation set rather than the entire training dataset. An outer hypergradient optimization of minibatch-level example weights is used to optimize for fairness (on the validation loss), interwoven with standard gradient optimization of the model parameters for the typical minibatch loss (given the weights). Previous work has deployed this approach with various predetermined weighting schemes for the outer optimization. The current work identifies a challenge with the stability of such approaches — in particular, often during an outer optimization there may exist a group whose validation loss hypergradient is not aligned with the overall hypergradient, leading to potentially unstable learning and failure to converge to the Pareto front (that is, the undominated groupies loss frontier). To address this challenge, the current work proposes a first stage (conducted for several epochs) wherein the outer optimization is conducted by Nash bargaining between the groups: Roughly speaking, a hypergradient is selected which maximizes the product of alignment between the groups, relative to a default alternative of no change to the re-weighing hyperparameters. This is done for some time, ideally until the agents are able to converge to the Pareto front, at which time a secondary optimization for a particular fairness objective similar to prior work is pursued as a fine-tuning. The method is validated in theory by demonstrating Pareto improvement under smoothness and boundedness conditions. Also, experiments are conducted on synthetic and real-world data. The benefit of the synthetic experiments is that the Pareto front can be explicitly computed, and that the method succeeds in converging to the front. The real world experiments show some improvements, though not universal or always dramatic, in fairness for predictive tasks including with unbalanced data, compared to previous meta-learning approaches that do not utilize Nash Bargaining.

Strengths

The paper does a good job of identifying a serious challenge to the learning stability of prior meta learning techniques for fairness. The challenges of hypergradient conflict is intuitive, coherent, and well described. The methods proposed, inspired by Nash Bargaining, are reasonable and original for resolving these conflicts. The theoretical work is a nice contribution, providing both closed form solutions for the bargaining step and a well-grounded argument for Pareto improvement throughout the process. The paper does a good job of presenting a lot of results in a clear way with attention placed on visualizations and comprehensive tables for the benefit of the reader. Several different datasets are used and presented to do a good job of not overstating performance based on a single dataset. In terms of impact and significance, group fairness-aware predictive models are of clear importance to the community, and the paper addresses one promising technique for dealing with the difficult case where group labels are not generally available for the entire training dataset. The technique proposed seems promising for continued development in contexts of fairness as well as simple problems of class imbalance.

Weaknesses

Lots of empirical results and observations on synthetic data and for a particular model architecture, but any specifics about the synthetic data and model architecture are hidden in the appendix. Of particular concern is the lack of discussion around limitations of the scale of the experiments, given that the proposed method introduces additional complexity into the training process designed to address instability of existing meta learning approaches. The real-world dataset examples use very small MLPs with a single 128 neuron hidden layer, and the image examples from CIFAR only use 5,000 or 500 training examples. Similarly, the real-world experiments use (I believe) at most 5 groups. Discussion around line 275 “Our experiments show…does not deviate the model from the Pareto front…” I think it should be noted explicitly and emphasized that these experiments are on synthetic examples constructed for purpose of simplicity of analysis, so this trend should not be taken as a given in real-world data where one cannot necessarily even calculate the Pareto front to be able to verify the property. It would be nice to see some evaluation of the frequency with which bargaining fails in the real-world data, as well as the relative importance for resolving hypergradient conflicts between (1) constraining optimization to the agreement set A, and (2) optimizing within A particularly along the Nash objective. Typos/grammar: 1. “hypergradeint” instead of “hypergradient” on line 91. 2. Line 144-145, found the phrasing a little confusing 3. Line 271 “if encountered one”

Questions

Q1. Referring to the discussion around lines 151-160. What is the relative significance for the empirical optimization results for simply constraining the hypergradient optimization to the alternative set A [requiring improvement for all groups] versus the selection of the Nash objective in particular to optimize within A? Q2. Also, how common is it for A to be empty, and would you expect this to become increasingly the case when looking at larger numbers of groups? It seems that in the experiments (referring to the Appendix A.6 details) there are only ever <= 5 groups, is it possible that this approach could stall or encounter more challenges for larger numbers of groups?

Rating

7

Confidence

3

Soundness

3

Presentation

3

Contribution

3

Limitations

No concern

Reviewer gYXi6/10 · confidence 2/52024-07-13

Summary

This paper proposes a novel method to solve the unfairness issue in machine learning. In particular, the authors observed that, existing methods may cause "hypergradient conflict" during the optimization process. To resolve the hypergradient conflict, this paper applies the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), and operates in two stages: The first stage resolves the hypergradient conflict and obtains a solution near the Pareto front, and the next stage applies the fairness constraints.

Strengths

1. This paper presents a subtle yet important observation on hypergradient conflict, that can cause inefficiency while learning fair representations. 2. The application of the NBS is novel and seems appropriate for this scenario. 3. The algorithm is provided with extensive theoretical justifications (section 3.5).

Weaknesses

Although the approach is novel, more technical explanations on the game theoretical model may be needed. In particular, as far as I understand the work, incentives play a critical role and they provide justifications of many important processes, e.g. the bargaining. However, the origins of payoffs, the set of feasible utility payoffs, and disagreement point (on Page 4) were not emphasized, so I am interested in how the payoffs are determined? Also, were they pre-determined and fixed, or do they change during the algorithm?

Questions

In equation (4), the utility is defined as $u_i (\nabla L_{\alpha}) = g_i^{\top} \nabla L_{\alpha}$. It is easy to see that if the value is non-positive, then there is a misalignment. However, if it is positive, does the magnitude tell us some information, e.g. if the value is large?

Rating

6

Confidence

2

Soundness

4

Presentation

3

Contribution

3

Limitations

Yes, future directions are discussed at the last section.

Reviewer YN1k6/10 · confidence 4/52024-07-20

Summary

The paper addresses group-level fairness in ML with two-stage meta learning. The modeler is given access to a sensitive-group-labeled *validation* dataset and must simultaneously design how to (linearly) weight each group loss in validation via bargaining to resolve gradient conflicts, and how to translate those group weights into weights for each unlabeled sample in the training set (minibatch). The paper is supported by a proof of their Nash bargaining solution that does not rely on linear independence and empirical results for their implementation.

Strengths

The NBS solution proposed here is very well motivated and, to my knowledge, novel in this particular sub-field. The overall goal of the NBS is to find optimal weights \beta for each group loss. The utility per group is computed as the inner product of the gradient wrt the group loss and the grad wrt the weighted group loss function; the disagreement payoff for each player (group) is to simply stop optimization and keep the model as-is. Essentially, group weights are negotiated such that each group's loss gradient has sufficient (positive) alignment, and axiomatically disallows any one group to be unilaterally overruled (the 'do nothing' disagreement outcome has a higher overall payoff than any solution where any player sees their utility alignment become negative). The resulting algorithm is relatively straightforward, though compared to simpler two-stage approaches, the bargaining stage requires K second order gradients per minibatch, as well as solving for a non-linear, non-negative equation to devise the optimal weights alpha per bargaining round

Weaknesses

The computational costs of the bargaining phase could be considerable (see strengths). To this extent, the authors actually only run the bargaining stage in some predefined set of bargaining rounds Tbar and then continue with the weights fixed. I did not see anything to suggest these weights would remain constant once a bargaining solution is achieved, or any particular guidance or intuition on how this Tbar parameter is selected.

Questions

The experimental section enhances several approaches (LtR, FORML, Meta-gDRO) with the proposed bargaining stage. To my understanding, these all differ only in their original choice of per-group weights \beta and do not incorporate any additional steps in the bargaining phase to ensure the original objective is being preserved. The results of the enhanced algorithm for all of these experiments are quite different so this would suggest quite a strong sensibility of the overall bargaining procedure to the initial weight \beta^0. I would like the authors to elaborate on this further and provide an intuitive or formal explanation on why the bargaining solutions exhibit such strong sensitivity to this initial parameter.

Rating

6

Confidence

4

Soundness

3

Presentation

3

Contribution

3

Limitations

None

Reviewer hQxX2024-08-10

I acknowledge that I have read the author rebuttal. Thank you very much for your detailed responses. I hope that the discussion has improved the paper and appreciate the contributions of the current work even if there are interesting questions of scale for the future. A nice paper, in my opinion!

Authorsrebuttal2024-08-12

Thank you so much for your kind words! We agree and appreciate your feedback. We’ve been making editions according to the comments along the way and will finalize in our camera-ready version.

Reviewer YN1k2024-08-12

Thanks for the clarifications. I read the other reviewers' comments and still like the paper, so I'll continue to advocate for its acceptance (with my current score).

Authorsrebuttal2024-08-12

Thank you so much for your advocacy! We’re glad that you like our paper. We’ve been working on improving the paper for the camera-ready version as suggested. Your time and review is greatly appreciated.

Reviewer gYXi2024-08-13

Thanks for the response

I appreciate the authors' response, which addresses my concern. I have decided to raise my rating from 5 to 6.

Program Chairsdecision2024-09-25

Decision

Accept (poster)

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