Summary
This paper provides a UK-and-European-law-based view of anti-discrimination law as it relates to fair machine learning and automated decision systems. It does a good job laying out the doctrine, arguing correctly that work in this area to-date is very centered on US legal concepts such as disparate treatment vs. disparate impact. Although I am willing to believe that there are subtle differences that drive important aspects of fair ML analysis, as the paper claims, I think the specifics of these differences could be made much clearer and need to be for the paper to have the impact it should.
Of particular note, the paper is very well situated in the surrounding literature. Although this contextualization should make the contributions more clearly offset from prior work, as presented I find the opposite: it is difficult to tell what is new as a contribution here. For example, while the contributions are clearly identified in 1.4, I think it would aid the paper if they appeared higher in the intro and were clearer about what is new and why it matters. The example in Appendix A could be used as a running example to show where new concepts are needed and what about existing work does not capture this different legal regime. In particular, after claiming that disparate treatment/disparate impact are distinct to direct & indirect discrimination, the definitions given from 105-114 seem to align tightly to the former. And while I'm not a lawyer, I don't believe that disparate impact claims require a showing of intent under US law either, so I found that distinction somewhat confusing.
On the technical level, the discussion of the true data generating process should really be contextualized in the literature on measurement and construct validity, specifically with respect to work by Jacobs & Wallach, which in particular encompasses the material in 2.3 on estimation parity (at least in part). Also, the causal analysis components of the discussion of data generation could cite more of the work of Kohler-Hausmann and also Hu (one paper from these authors is cited, but others are also relevant and speak more directly to causality and counterfactual fairness claims).
As a final observation, although the ML community talks in terms of "fair" outcomes, it is often conceptually clearer (and more in line with legal analysis) to use the same techniques as tools for identifying "unfair" activities or outcomes. Phrasing some of the claims this way may condense some arguments and tighten the presentation overall. Related to this, the discussion of these tools as part of an overall practical strategy for risk management is important and should receive more attention. For example, it would be good to discuss how the measures proposed would be used in real legal analysis of an example, such as in litigation or a regulatory proceeding.
I was also a bit confused about the analysis of constructed proxies for protected variables in 2.7. I understand that it's necessary to look beyond a formalistic view of whether a specific attribute is considered, but what happens if the proxy for a protected attribute is (say) the sum of two legitimate attributes? Why is it good enough to use only legitimate features? Also, at 393-394 it might be valuable to look at the recent paper on "Less Discriminatory Algorithms" and compare the approaches and outlooks.
Incredibly minor:
* There is a missing period at 81.
* At 284-288, there is a latent call to questions of ecological validity which could be made more explicit
Weaknesses
* Novelty is at times hard to identify. I think it's there, but the claims on what it covers should be clearer. In particular, the discussion of the decision-theoretic framing seems a bit under-attended even though it's potentially very useful.
* Some important concepts are missed, notably theories of measurement and construct validity/reliability are at least partially re-invented when they should just be treated as background.
Questions
* Can the example in Appendix A be a running example?
* What is new over and above existing literature on ML fairness? How can this novelty be more clearly offset in the presentation? Here I think specifically about the conclusions at 415-430, which seem rather anodyne in light of existing literature.