Part 2
---
**Q6. In remark 1 the authors claim that [RL21] did something wrong in their derivation because the slicing matrix U is not included in the privacy mechanism. Is U independent of the dataset X? Why will U affect the privacy analysis?**
A.6. Yes, U is generated independently of the dataset X, but the sliced output UX is clearly dependent on U, hence conditioned on (UX), U and X are now dependent! Since the generative model training requires both the projected data and the projection directions (i.e., the U matrix must be known to the model during training), not accounting for the fact U is known can result in privacy leakage.
As an analogy, let’s consider the simple additive noise setting, where the output from a Laplace mechanism is used. In such a case, any downstream operation must not access the Laplace noise added by the privacy mechanism. If it did, the noise could be used to denoise the answer, even if the noise is independent of the real data. This is a crucial oversight, which we remedy by explicitly including all needed factors in the privacy analysis.
---
**Q7. Line 221, "...we can achieve a tighter privacy bound by reducing a factor of..." How this factor is derived?**
A7. The intuition is that a deterministic U corresponds to a scenario where the adversary can engage with the design of the privacy mechanism and choose how to project the data. This grants the adversary more freedom to influence the design of the privacy mechanism, resulting in a less effective privacy protection.
Technically, we derive this factor by comparing the Renyi divergence between two privacy mechanisms, where one has random U and the other has deterministic U (see Proposition 3 in the appendix).
---
**Q8. Is the proposed approach scalable to other domains like image datasets as well?**
A.8. Thank you for bringing up this concern. Indeed, our proposed approach is applicable and scalable to other domains, including image data. For instance, please refer to our domain adaptation experiment (Section 4.2), where we apply our method to MNIST and USPS datasets.
In Figure 1 of the attached PDF, we also have considered private image generative modeling for MNIST, showing that our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art baseline MERF method for larger privacy budgets. In this experiment, note that MERF, as implemented by the authors thereof, only uses the mean embedding of the real data in each class. This allows them to use much lower noise and achieve better results for low epsilon levels, but damages performance for higher privacy budgets since their approach cannot learn the diversity of each class’s distribution (due to taking the mean only). This explains the trends we see and emphasizes the advantages of our approach that requires no such limiting preprocessing step and can retain the full diversity of the data distribution.
In Table 1 of the PDF, we add MERF to the experiment in the main text, showing that our proposed method (often significantly) outperforms MERF in 20 out of the 24 metrics across five datasets, including all 10 categorical metrics, 4 out of 5 classifier F1 scores, and 6 ouf of 9 numerical metrics. We used the implementation at https://github.com/ParkLabML/DP-MERF for this experiment.
We hope the above answers clarify the reviewer’s view of our work, and if any questions remain, please let us know!