Summary
The paper introduces an adversarial defense method, CausalDiff, which leverages a causal model of robustness combined with a diffusion model to learn label-relevant causative representations. The effectiveness of CausalDiff is specifically demonstrated against unseen attacks, where it surpasses existing adversarial defense baselines on several image classification datasets.
Strengths
- This paper is well-motivated, presenting a novel framework that extracts the disentangled essential features of an image, achieved by first training a diffusion model and then inferring from it.
- The pilot study is easy to understand, and the results persuasively demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed causality-inspired defense framework.
- A comprehensive comparison with baselines of adversarial defense methods, especially those based on Diffusion Models, makes the results convincing.
Weaknesses
- Limited discussion about related works. To my knowledgement, neither CausalAdv and DICE limits their modeling of adversarial distribution to a certain type of attack. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss how the proposed method differs from these important baselines in terms of causal modeling.
- The writing can be improved. The challenges listed from line 53 to 66 could be clearer by focusing on highlighting the actual problems that are solved by the proposed method, rather than just listing how the method is implemented. For example, challenge (2) could be clarified by explaining that applying a *Causal Information Bottleneck* objective aims to minimize the essential factors to their minimal necessary extent.
- The empirical results of the pilot study are convincing. However, the insight into how to extract the desired features (i.e., S, Z) appears unclear, as detailed in Q2-Q3.
Questions
Q1: Could you provide further insight into the source of CausalDiff’s ability to generalize to unseen attacks? For example, what attributes of the *essential factor* for benign images enable its generalizability to unseen attacks, and are there any specific constraints regarding the types of unseen attacks?
Q2: Could the author further explain the reason for the opposite optimization direction $(1 - \lambda) I(X;S,Z)$ in Eq. 5? E.g., what is the relationship between the motivation of avoiding "X containing too many unimportant details" (line 196) and the "insensitivity" for $-\lambda I(X;S,Z)$ in Fig. 2? These statements seem to imply the existence of a feature that is neither "essential" (i.e., S) nor "non-essential but important for reconstructing X" (i.e., Z). This kind of feature appears crucial for "sensitivity" but is not fully discussed in the paper.
Q3: Any abation study on the parameter $\lambda$ used in Eq.5, which typically plays a crucial role in IB-style objectives?
Q4: Other minor typos.
- There is a citation format error in line 21, and a method name mistake (with / without) in line 124.
Limitations
- The defense performance is superior against adversarial attacks with L_p norm constraints. However, the effectiveness of the proposed method against unbounded attacks (e.g., semantic attacks[1]) remains unclear.
- Considering the high computational cost and training budget associated with diffusion models tailored to a single image classifier, CausalDiff may lack practicality. Strategies to reduce these costs should be considered. For instance, could a smaller diffusion model be trained to replace the two different diffusion models (unconditional and conditional) through model distillation?
[1] Ghiasi, Amin, Ali Shafahi, and Tom Goldstein. "BREAKING CERTIFIED DEFENSES: SEMANTIC ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES WITH SPOOFED ROBUSTNESS CERTIFICATES." *International Conference on Learning Representations*.