We study the power of (competitive) algorithms with predictions in a multiagent setting. We introduce a two predictor framework, that assumes that agents use one predictor for their future (self) behavior, and one for the behavior of the other players. The main problem we are concerned with is understanding what are the best competitive ratios that can be achieved by employing such predictors, under various assumptions on predictor quality. As an illustration of our framework, we introduce and analyze a multiagent version of the ski-rental problem. In this problem agents can collaborate by pooling resources to get a group license for some asset. If the license price is not met then agents have to rent the asset individually for the day at a unit price. Otherwise the license becomes available forever to everyone at no extra cost. We show that blindly following the predictors is a strategy that is not robust to mispredictions of agent's future behavior (even when the others-predictor is perfect). We alleviate this by proposing (and benchmarking) a meta-algorithm with better robustness properties.