Signals and Spoils: Speculative Oracle Extractable Value in the Era of Cross-Chain Interoperability

A new form of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), termed speculative MEV, has emerged across Layer-2 blockchains. Unlike Ethereum mainnet, many Layer-2 systems lack a public mempool, forcing extraction strategies to become probabilistic: searchers emit multiple identical transactions hoping to capture an opportunity first. This generates substantial transaction spam, increasing fees and wasting block space. We investigate speculative Oracle Extractable Value (OEV), a form of MEV associated with liquidating undercollateralized loans via speculative backrunning of oracle price updates. We propose a methodology for detecting speculative liquidations in the wild and apply it across Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism. On October 10, 2025, we identify 64 speculative liquidators on Aave (57% of all detected liquidators) and 831 successful speculative liquidations (39% of all successful liquidations across the three chains). We further examine whether latency differences in oracle price feed updates across blockchains can be exploited for cross-chain OEV. Specifically, we ask whether a searcher can observe oracle updates on one chain and frontrun liquidation opportunities on another. We systematically analyze Chainlink Decentralized Oracle Network (DON) configurations (deviation thresholds, heartbeat intervals, and submitted price observations) across Arbitrum, Base, Ethereum, and Optimism. Our dataset comprises 63 Chainlink feeds, 12,009 price updates, and over 100,000 oracle observations linked to 2,986 Aave liquidations. We show that independent DONs consume largely identical off-chain price data nearly simultaneously yet publish updates at different times, creating statistically predictable cross-chain exploitation windows. We demonstrate that Chainlink updates on Optimism can predict subsequent updates on Arbitrum and Base, enabling speculative cross-chain OEV extraction.