Language models can state that"the Earth orbits the Sun"and, when role-playing Aristotle, assert the opposite. Recent work argues that persona adoption is fundamental to how language models behave, with models selecting the most appropriate persona for a given context. Does such role-playing merely change the model's outputs, or does it also affect what the model internally represents as truthful? We study this question using the role-play of characters whose beliefs differ from the modern consensus, and induce personas with a number of different methods: prompting, in-context learning (ICL), supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and Open Character Training (OCT), and Emergent Misalignment (EM). We measure belief internalization across these approaches with truth probes and with behavioral tests, finding a broad spectrum of belief internalization. Prompting, ICL, and SFT change what the model says with little representational change. EM creates a large, broad shift in the model's truth representation, and OCT a smaller shift that is clearest on the larger model. Understanding when training changes a model's worldview rather than merely its behavior may become increasingly important as AI systems are entrusted with greater autonomy and influence.