As the use of algorithmic systems in high-stakes decision-making increases, the ability to contest algorithmic decisions is being recognised as an important safeguard for individuals. Yet, there is little guidance on what 'contestability'--the ability to contest decisions--in relation to algorithmic decision-making requires. Recent research presents different conceptualisations of contestability in algorithmic decision-making. We contribute to this growing body of work by describing and analysing the perspectives of people and organisations who made submissions in response to Australia's proposed 'AI Ethics Framework', the first framework of its kind to include 'contestability' as a core ethical principle. Our findings reveal that while the nature of contestability is disputed, it is seen as a way to protect individuals, and it resembles contestability in relation to human decision-making. We reflect on and discuss the implications of these findings.
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