Dynamic Evolution Analysis of Incentive Strategies and Symmetry Enhancement in the Personal-Data Valorization Industry Chain

The value of personal data can only be unlocked through efficient circulation. This study explores a multi-party collaborative mechanism for personal-data trading, aiming to improve data quality and market vitality via incentive-compatible institutional design, thereby supporting the high-quality development of the digital economy. Symmetry enhancement refers to the use of strategies and mechanisms to narrow the information gap among data controllers, operators, and demanders, enabling all parties to facilitate personal-data transactions on relatively equal footing. Drawing on evolutionary-game theory, we construct a tripartite dynamic-game model that incorporates data controllers, data operators, and data demanders. We analyze how initial willingness, payoff structures, breach costs, and risk factors (e.g., data leakage) shape each party’s strategic choices (cooperate vs. defect) and their evolutionary trajectories, in search of stable equilibrium conditions and core incentive mechanisms for a healthy market. We find that (1) the initial willingness to cooperate among participants is the foundation of a virtuous cycle; (2) the net revenue of data products significantly influences operators’ and demanders’ propensity to cooperate; and (3) the severity of breach penalties and the potential losses from data leakage jointly affect the strategies of all three parties, serving as key levers for maintaining market trust and compliance. Accordingly, we recommend strengthening contract enforcement and trust-building; refining the legal and regulatory framework for data rights confirmation, circulation, trading, and security; and promoting stable supply–demand cooperation and market education to enhance awareness of data value and compliance, thereby stimulating individuals’ willingness to authorize the use of their data and maximizing its value.