LEGAL PERSONHOOD BEYOND THE ELECTRONIC PERSON DEBATE: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AI SUBJECTHOOD

Debates on whether artificial intelligence (hereafter, AI) should be recognized as a ‘legal person’ often force regulators into a false binary choice, i.e., either grant AI full human-like status (which risks absurdity) or treat it as mere property (which creates liability gaps). This article argues that this all or nothing approach stalls necessary regulation. Drawing on Visa Kurki’s ‘Bundle Theory,’ the authors propose the ‘Legal Platform’ as a necessary evolutionary step toward potential personhood. Just as corporate personhood evolved over centuries from simple property holding bodies to rights bearing entities, AI personhood must begin with a functional ‘platform’, which is a distinct legal structure bundling mandatory insurance, registration, and guardianship. We stress test this model against the failures of ‘performative personhood’ (such as the robot Sophia) and successful non-human frameworks (like New Zealand’s Whanganui River). The article concludes that before we can grant AI full moral personhood, we must first build its legal skeleton, which is, a mandatory liability platform that ensures safety, solvency, and accountability without committing to immediate human-level rights.