As the applications of artificial intelligence continue to burgeon across every industry, it has created a crisis in copyright law. AI challenges the foundational assumption that authorship is distinctly a human title. While courts have historically adapted to new creative technologies, the recent rejection of copyright claims in Thaler v. Perlmutter and the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Naruto v. Slater revealed a critical gap in the legal doctrine. Current U.S. law is unclear on what circumstances human and artificial intelligence collaboration satisfy the constitutional and statutory requirement of human-centered and originality. This paper argues that courts can and should recognize intellectual property rights for artificial intelligence assisted works that exhibit a spark of human creativity, without redefining authorship. It does this by taking account of historical precedence of seminal cases like Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony and Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., and by comparing international approaches taken by China, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. The paper proposes a statutory Human Contribution test that requires three key elements, demonstrable creative direction, intellectual shaping of product, and an authorial intent to create said work. By clarifying the boundaries of authorship in AI-assisted work, this paper introduces a framework that resolves a pressing legal dilemma and ensures copyright law continues to incentivize human innovation, prevent market distortions, and fulfill its constitutional purpose to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" in the age of artificial intelligence.
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