The chapter argues that speech produced by generative AI technologies should not enjoy First Amendment protections. It first lays out the theory of conscious free speech protections. My core premise is that intentionality is an intrinsic feature of human thought but is non-existent in computers. The conscious underpinnings of the mind and its relation to constitutional protections will inform the essay's legal analysis of one of the most intractable issues of our time, how and the extent to which algorithmic machines and LLMs can be regulated without encroaching upon the Free Speech Clause. Scholars who equate the constitutional value of human speech and algorithmic outputs tend to focus on the value of information to audiences without adequately assessing whether free speech protections should extend to machine-generated content. Were courts to apply free speech doctrines to data produced by AI, the same stringent judicial scrutiny would apply to them as to natural humans. The chapter's normative arguments draw on European regulation on LLMs and social media, which recognize that speech and its constitutional value are tied to human dignity.
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