Beyond Falsity in Misinformation, Disinformation, and Fake News: Towards a Theory of Autonomous Decision‑Making
Misinformation, disinformation, and fake news are widely studied in Information Systems (IS). IS research commonly includes veracity in definitions or meta‑theoretical accounts of misinformation, disinformation, and fake news. We argue that veracity is a problematic qualifier. Deceptive communication can preserve the truth, which can be more dangerous than outright lies. Moreover, deceptive communication can rely on vague claims that avoid falsification. Finally, genuine communication often contains justified falsehoods. Given these concerns, we propose a theoretical account of deceptive communication. According to its main tenet, genuine communication should not violate individuals’ autonomous decision‑making.
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