Hostile influence operations target, by definition, the domestic public of the country being defended, andcurrent defensive practice almost always arrives late: it detects a narrative once it is already loud,dismantles it after the fact, and documents its effects once those effects have occurred. The delay is not afailure of execution but a category error, because it treats a contingent and future problem as though it werea hidden fact waiting to be discovered.The remedy proposed here is to integrate an analytical function that anticipates the narrative rather thanchasing it. It is necessary, however, to be precise about what such a function can and cannot do. Whether anarrative takes hold depends on factors that have yet to interact: it is not predictable in any strict sense, andat best its patterns can be hypothesised. The system therefore does not claim to predict which story will takehold; it pre-positions falsifiable hypotheses in order to compress reaction time. What it offers is time, notforesight, and it must be measured accordingly: the primary metric is lead time, not the accuracy of anypoint prediction
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