Doctrine of the Examiner: On the Danger of Artificial Intelligence and the Honesty of Work in the Age of the Machine
This doctrine confronts the reflexive resistance to artificial intelligence in the academy and the arts. It argues that the true danger of AI is not that machines write, but that the world is filling with assertions no one answers for — claims without sources, figures without reckoning. Against two errors, refusal and surrender, it proposes a single law: a work is judged not by the hand or machine that composed it, but by whether it can be examined. It shows that the institutions which banned AI named the right principle — accountability — then betrayed it by banning the tool instead of demanding a bearer; that copyright law in Bartz v. Anthropic locates the wrong not in learning but in theft; and that AI-detection scanners guard a shadow, abandoned even by their makers. It closes with a program of examinable practice and situates Indonesia’s belated, suspicion-first reception of the debate. Every dated claim is closed to a primary source in an appendix.
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