Summary
The authors claim a new, universal reward poisoning attack against offline reinforcement learning algorithms. Their attack assumes no prior information regarding the chosen algorithm of the training, victim party - instead aiming to generate reward perturbations that will be effective against any algorithm. They claim the first, universal poisoning attack against offline reinforcement learning in this black box setting.
They frame their objective as a constrained optimization problem aiming to find reward perturbations that are most likely to minimize the value of policies found by $\delta$-pessimistic offline RL algorithms. The adversary is restricted in the $l_\infty$ and $l_1$ norm of their reward perturbations.
They aim to achieve this objective with two main steps. They first learn a policy set $\Pi_2$ given the dataset $\mathcal{D}$ and then a sub-optimal policy $\pi_1$ given inverted rewards $\hat{r}_i = -r$. Using these policies they then decrease the rewards of "good" actions in the dataset $\mathcal{D}$ which are closer to $\Pi_2$ and increase the reward of "bad" actions close to $\pi_1$ in $\mathcal{D}$. The goal of this is that the victim agent should learn that "good" actions (according to the benign, unpoisoned MDP) are actually bad, while "bad" actions are actually good. Their attack is constrained by budget hyper-parameters $\Delta_1$ and $\Delta_2$.
They evaluate their attack on a suite of D4RL benchmarks and show they can decrease the expected return of the agent a decent amount more than more naive attacks under their reward poisoning constraints.
Strengths
The paper has a few strengths
* Researching poisoning attacks against RL, and especially offline RL, is an important direction of research, so I appreciate the authors for aiming to add to the body of literature on this topic.
* The study is motivated within the context of most related work.
* The paper is fairly easy to follow.
* Their attack improves over their proposed baselines.
Weaknesses
**Motivation -** The paper's motivation is placed fairly well within the context of related works, but I don't think the attack's objectives are well motivated within the context of a real world attack. This attack formulation is indiscriminate, meaning the agent's performance in all states is harmed. Lets now assume the attack is perfectly successful, minimizing $J_\mathcal{R}(\pi)$. Given this outcome, the party training the agent will be able to observe that the agent is completely failing to solve the desired task, so they'll never actually deploy it in the real world. This essentially makes the offline dataset $\mathcal{D}$ useless after poisoning, which could be one angle for why this attack formulation is interesting, but the trained agent will never actually cause negative outcomes down the line. For this same reason I think the slightly weaker objective of decreasing $J_\mathcal{R}(\pi)$ below some $V$ is also poorly motivated.
I think the authors should better motivate their attack objectives in the context of something a real adversary would hope to induce. I further suggest they compare and justify these objectives against those of backdoor poisoning attacks [1,2,3] which are much stealthier. It may also be interesting if the authors shift their adversarial objective to be less indiscriminate, perhaps only affecting a subset of trajectories or states rather than all states.
**Theory -** The paper's theoretical results are disconnected from the method that is developed and the claims they make in text. To me Theorem 4.4 is the main theoretical claim of the paper (though this is not completely clear based on the writing), which seems to claim that $J_\mathcal{R}(\pi) \geq V$ given some $\pi$ trained on poisoned rewards $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$. This seems to go against their objective of $J_\mathcal{R}(\pi) < V$. The result doesn't make sense to me and isn't supported by the proof given in the appendix. The proof only claims that the agent will learn a $\delta$-pessimistic policy over $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$, which I agree with, but it doesn't show how this relates to the value of the policy ($V$) under $\mathcal{R}$. Due to this I don't think the claim made in theorem 4.4 is correct. Furthermore, even if Theorem 4.4 is true, the theorem does not connect back to the method presented in algorithm 1, meaning there is nothing meaningful to say about how we should expect the attack to perform. Theorem 4.5 is also a bit confusing since it seems to be just presenting the attack's objectives rather than any guarantees afforded by the attack.
The paper also claims "universal" poisoning attacks, but only considers $\delta$-pessimistic algorithms in their theory. I don't think their method necessarily relies on targeting $\delta$-pessimistic algorithms (again since the theory doesn't seem to connect to the method), but I still think making the claim of "universal" is too strong without better theoretical results. I suggest the authors consider the effect that their poisoning has on the optimal policy of the MDP rather than performing their analysis over the class of learning algorithms. See [4] for examples of such analysis.
The proofs found in the appendix are also very short and informal, so I am not completely convinced by them. I think they make intuitive sense, but they rely really heavily on Assumption 4.1 doing the heavy lifting.
**Presentation -** the paper has a lot of notation and grammar mistakes. In particular the text claims the attacker wants to minimize the $l_\infty$ norm of their attack, which makes sense, but equations 1 and 2 consider the $l_0$ norm. I think if the authors intended to use $l_\infty$ in these equations, but I could be wrong. Also see line 282 "near-policy policies".
Another issue is that the paper frequently overloads terms and notation. For instance, in the text under equation 1 the authors seem to refer to $\mathcal{L}$ as both a set of policies and a set of algorithms. After reading the paragraph a few times I believe I understand what the authors are saying, but I think even this adds to the confusion. I agree that one cannot consider all possible algorithms, as I can always design an algorithm that outputs an arbitrary policy, but I don't think these cases are important to the paper's analysis. Instead I recommend the authors just consider the affect their attack has over the optimal policy given the dataset rather than considering a set of algorithms.
There are also a few pieces of the paper which I think are redundant and can be removed to save space. For instance, equations 1 and 2 are nearly identical, along with the two conditions of theorem 4.5. The fact that the attack is black box is stated 3 times in bullet points under "Universal and Black Box", "Universal and Black box attack", and "No knowledge of the learning algorithm".
**Experimental Results -** The paper's experimental results are okay, but they aren't too strong. I think a more novel attack formulation would be required to have stronger results under these constraints. An attack objective which only considers a subset of states may be able to perform better.
**Summary -** I think the study of indiscriminate attacks against offline RL isn't well motivated since they just result in policies that are never deployed. I would be okay with this attack formulation if the theoretical or empirical results were novel, but I think this paper needs stronger theoretical analysis and a better methodology before it can meet that criteria.
[1] "BAFFLE: Hiding Backdoors in Offline Reinforcement Learning Datasets" https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.04688
[2] "TrojDRL: Trojan Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning Agents" https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.06638
[3] "SleeperNets: Universal Backdoor Poisoning Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning Agents" https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.20539
[4] "Understanding the Limits of Poisoning Attacks in Episodic Reinforcement Learning" https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.13663
Questions
* Can you please explain the results you claim with theorem 4.4? It is hard to understand what the theorem is really stating.
* Why should an attacker implement this form of attack over a backdoor attack, given they have access to the data?