Weaknesses
This work is missing two critical competitor baselines which must be addressed.
-In my opinion, the FreqMark is an incremental variant of the StegaStamp [1]. Surprisingly, the authors did not compare against this method even though it is well-known in existing literature that the StegaStamp is robust against many attacks, including regeneration [2]. Like FreqMark, the StegaStamp increases resilience against attacks by incorporating them into the training pipeline and uses a critic loss to preserve image quality (LPIPS + L2, versus LPIPS + PSNR for FreqMark). The resemblance of equation (10) in this manuscript to the loss function equation (2) in [1] begs the question of novelty. It is also incorrectly stated in line 71 that the StegaStamp only relies on differential image perturbations for the training pipelines -- in fact, any attack can be added, as the decoder is trained after image manipulation.
-Again, if the spirit of the paper is to increase resilience against regenerations, the authors also needed to compare against the state-of-the-art Tree-Ring watermark [4], which was noted to be incredibly resilient against regenerations by the authors of the regeneration attack [2]. As the Tree-Ring is an in-processing technique that embeds a message within a diffusion process, one way to set up a comparison is to post-process a collection of Tree-Ring watermarked images via FreqMark, and then independently extract both watermarks.
-As noted in [3], there is no single perceptual metric that is an objective measure of image quality, thus low PSNR or LPIPS distance does not necessarily indicate the method is not introducing artifacts. The authors need to add 1-2 more metrics (maybe L2 and FID, for example) for a more convincing argument.
-500 images is too small a sample size for the tested FPR thresholds. Modern literature in this field such as [3,4,5] are using several thousand images.
-VAE regenerations are far weaker compared to diffusion regenerations. Readers will want to see how the FreqMark holds up against longer, deeper regenerations (>= 100 steps) to see how the decoding accuracy is affected.
-As observed in [3], the use of publicly available VAEs to encode/decode watermarks is easily defeated if the attacker uses a regeneration leveraging encoders/decoders with the same architecture.
[1] Tancik, M., Mildenhall, B., & Ng, R. (2020). Stegastamp: Invisible hyperlinks in physical photographs. In Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision and pattern recognition (pp. 2117-2126).
[2] Zhao, X., Zhang, K., Su, Z., Vasan, S., Grishchenko, I., Kruegel, C., ... & Li, L. (2023). Invisible image watermarks are provably removable using generative ai. arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.01953.
[3] An, B., Ding, M., Rabbani, T., Agrawal, A., Xu, Y., Deng, C., ... & Huang, F. (2024). Benchmarking the robustness of image watermarks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.08573.
[4] Wen, Y., Kirchenbauer, J., Geiping, J., & Goldstein, T. (2023). Tree-ring watermarks: Fingerprints for diffusion images that are invisible and robust. arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.20030.
[5] Saberi, M., Sadasivan, V. S., Rezaei, K., Kumar, A., Chegini, A., Wang, W., & Feizi, S. (2023). Robustness of ai-image detectors: Fundamental limits and practical attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.00076.